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"Just Say No!": The Right to Refuse Psychotropic
Medication in Long-Term Care Facilities
George P. Smith, I*
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In early October 2002, the State of New York sought to end a six-year-
old practice that had been in place and was designed to lower its large eco-
nomic investment in psychiatric hospital care: namely, discharging patients
to secure or locked units in private nursing homes.1 With its annual cost of
maintaining a patient in a psychiatric hospital having risen to approximately
$120,000, New York decided that it would be more cost-effective to move
the mentally disabled to special units within nursing homes where its share
of support would be $20,000.2 Federal funds would absorb the remainder
through the Medicaid program.3
The economic success of this plan is indisputable. The number of occu-
pied beds in state psychiatric hospitals dropped from 9000 in 1995 to its
present level of 4300,4 which resulted in saving of tens of millions of dol-
lars.5 Critics of this policy have raised civil rights concerns, citing the vir-
tual imprisonment of the patients and their restricted ability to contest con-
finement.6 Prompted by this criticism, the United States Department of
Justice is evaluating whether such levels of confinement violate the Civil
Rights of Institutional Persons Act.7 The situation in New York dramati-
* B.S., J.D., Indiana University-Bloomington; LL.M., Columbia University; LL.D., Indiana
University-Bloomington. Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America. I ac-
knowledge with pleasure the research assistance of two former students, Thaddeus J. Bums
and Pia Bellafiore, in the preparation of this article.
1. Clifford J. Levy, Hospitals Will Stop Sending Mentally Ill to Nursing Homes, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2002, at Al. See generally George P. Smith, II, Patient Dumping: Implica-
tions for the Elderly, 6 ELDER L.J. 165 (1998).
2. Levy, supra note 1.
3. New York's Mentally Ill Deserve Better, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2002, at A26.
4. Id.
5. Levy, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Associated Press, Housing of Mentally Ill in Nursing Homes Questioned, HOOSIER
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at A5, available at http://www.heraldtimesonline.com.
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cally illustrates the scope of the major issues confronting nursing homes.
Specifically, it illustrates the following issues: whether the deliverance of
psychiatric care to nursing homes safeguards the best interests of the resi-
dents; whether it protects their civil rights to decline various levels of
treatment administered; and, whether this goal is achieved within a cost ef-
fective administrative framework.
Each year more than 1.5 million individuals are admitted to nursing
homes in the United States.8 In 1997 there were more than 17,000 nursing
homes with over 1.7 million beds.9 In 1998, the Health Care Financing
Administration reported to Congress that residents of nursing homes in
America were continuing to suffer from inadequate care and neglect.10
With the precipitous increase in the elder population nationwide, prob-
lems peculiar to the elderly have demanded increased attention and re-
sources from policy-makers and their constituents." In response to this
situation, Congress has recognized the importance of devising strategies to
implement a policy of protecting the rights of residents of long-term care
facilities. One congressional solution, developed and subsequently incorpo-
rated by amendment into the Older Americans Act of 1965, provides for the
establishment of a long-term care ombudsman 12 program by any state re-
8. Angela S. Quin, Imposing Federal Criminal Liability on Nursing Homes: A Way of
Deterring Inadequate Health Care and Improving the Quality of Care Delivered?, 43 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 653, 654 (1999). See also ADMIN. ON AGING, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS. (DHHS), A PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS: 2001 (2001) (noting that the per-
centage of Americans over sixty-five years of age or older has more than tripled since 1900
and is expected to more than double by 2030), available at http://www.research.aarp.org/
general/profile 2001.pdf. See also Heidi Boerstler & Scott W. Nolte, Colorado Nursing
Homes: Litigation and Public Policy Issues Concerning Abuse and Neglect, 29 COLO. LAW
93, 93 (2000) (noting that an estimated forty-four percent of all Americans will be forced to
spend some amount of time in a long-term care facility during their lifetime).
9. Quin, supra note 8, at 654.
10. DHHS, HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION FACT SHEET: ASSURING THE QUALITY OF
NURSING HOME CARE (June 21, 1998), at http://www.hhs.gov. See also Boerstler & Nolte,
supra note 8, at 93 (noting that it has been projected that the number of nursing homes is
likely to grow by 400% in the next thirty years).
11. Audrey S. Garfield, Elder Abuse and the States 'Adult Protective Services Response:
Time for a Change in California, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 859, 861 (1991).
12. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1115 (7th ed. 1999) (defining ombudsman as an "of-
ficial appointed to receive, investigate, and report on private citizens' complaints about the
government"). See also P.S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-American
Comparisons, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1002, 1033-35, 1042 (1987). This article discusses how other
countries have made greater use of this type of office as a means of resolving claims outside
the court system. For example, in Britain an ombudsman functions as a grievance commis-
sioner with investigatory powers. Id. at 1033. This office made its first appearance in Brit-
ain in the field of public administration as a result of a perceived need to protect private citi-
zens against government mal-administration. Id. In Britain, an ombudsman now assists in
the resolution of private disputes in the areas of banking, insurance, and nuisance law. Id. at
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ceiving federal funds under Title III of the Act.' 3 Thus, Congress made the
receipt of significant amounts of federal funds conditional on a state's de-
velopment and adherence to a comprehensive plan in compliance with the
Act. 14 Congress incorporated another proposed solution in The Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA '87)." OBRA '87 included ex-
tensive revisions to the statutory Medicare and Medicaid requirements for
long-term care facilities. 16
This article will examine the provisions of OBRA '87, surveying the case
law that deals with the rights of patients in mental institutions to refuse psy-
chotropic medication. It will first focus on the different substantive and
procedural rights afforded to patients under state common law, state consti-
tutions, and the Federal Constitution. Then, it will proceed to evaluate the
long-term impact of OBRA '87 on the rights of long-term care patients,
who refuse medication, to minimal administrative hearings instead of to full
judicial proceedings. Finally, this article will evaluate the Long-Term Care
Ombudsman Amendments to the Older Americans Act of 1965 concluding
that, unlike OBRA '87, the amendments articulate no right or cause of ac-
tion. Thus, their effect is only discemable with respect to state decisions
that have implemented provisions as a condition for the receipt of federal
funding.
The conclusion to be drawn is that more legislative fine-tuning must be
undertaken if the elderly in America are to be guaranteed protection of their
dwindling bundle of rights. At best, federal and state reforms here are seen
1042.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 3021(c) (1990), amended by Pub. L. 102-375 (1992) (substituting
"in accordance with section 3058g of this title, and to individuals within such programs des-
ignated under section 3058g of this title" for "and to individuals designated under such sec-
tion"), Pub. L. 103-171 (1993) (substituting "Assistant Secretary" for "Commissioner"
wherever appearing), Pub. L. 106-501, § 801(c)(1) (2000) (substituting "3027(a)(9)" for
"3027(a)(12)"); 42 U.S.C. § 3027(a)(12)(A) (1990), amended by Pub. L. 102-375 (1992) (re-
structuring paragraph (12)), Pub. L. 103-171 (1993) (substituting "Assistant Secretary" for
"Commissioner" wherever appearing), Pub. L. 106-501, § 306(5), (6) (2000) (redesignating
paragraph (16) as (12) and striking out former paragraph (12), and substituting new para-
graphs for paragraph (8) and (9)). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 302 1(c) (West 2003); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 3027(a) (West 2003). See generally Lisa T. Evren, Longterm-Care Ombudsmen: A Na-
tional Survey of Their Views, GENERATIONS, Summer 1987, at 43.
14. See § 3021(c); § 3027(a)(12)(A). Congress employs this method in many other ar-
eas, essentially conditioning a grant of federal funds upon the recipient state or entity's
agreement to comply with a regulatory framework. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000) (pro-
viding for the reimbursement of patient's expenses at a nursing home through Title XIX of
the Social Security Act, commonly known as Medicaid).
15. See The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat.
1330-275.
16. See generally Medicare and Medicaid; Requirements for Long Term Care Facilities,
54 Fed. Reg. 5316 (1989) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 405,442, 447, 483,488-89, 498).
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as imbalanced and, in part, erratic. Even with civil monetary penalties, vio-
lations by nursing homes continue. Current OBRA '87 regulations are de-
ficient in that they do not provide any civil remedies to residents for non-
compliance. 17
Due to the psychosociogenic and pathophysiologic changes occurring
with age, prescribing drugs for the elderly is far different from prescribing
for other members of society. 18 In addition to other mental problems, de-
pression is often associated with, and attributable to, elderly patients taking
multiple drugs ("polymedication"), which complicate and worsen their con-
ditions. 19 A lack of knowledge of pharmacogeriatrics by physicians also
increases the risk of side effects for elderly patients.2°
Antipsychotic drugs, commonly referred to as psychotropic or neurolep-
tic, are often used for the treatment of severe mental disorders. 21 Their ef-
fects are both positive and negative, for they not only reduce the symptoms
of the various disorders for which they are administered (e.g., schizophre-
nia) but also undercut individual willpower and therefore often subject pa-
tients to levels of custodial control.22 For this reason, the common law right
of informed consent (or here, the right to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment) is crucial to safeguarding a patient's civil rights. The right to refuse
this modality of treatment varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.23 In Cali-
fornia, for example, the right is grounded in statutory law, which guarantees
17. See Ellen J. Scott, Punitive Damages in Lawsuits Against Nursing Homes, 23 J.
LEGAL MED. 115, 116 (2002). See also Jennifer N. Phan, Comment & Note, The Graying of
America: Protecting Nursing Home Residents by Allowing Regulatory and Criminal Statutes
to Establish Standards of Care in Private Negligence Actions, 2 Hous. J. HEALTH & POL'Y
297 (2002). See generally GEORGE P. SMITH, II, LEGAL AND HEALTHCARE ETHICS FOR THE
ELDERLY (Joyce Duncan & Holly Seltzer eds., 1996).
18. James A. Jernigan, Update on Drugs and the Elderly, 29 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 238,
238 (1984).
19. Tina M. Champion, The Elderly Suing Doctors: Reasons and Recovery, 12 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 895, 900 (2002). See also Ann Kahl et al., Geriatric Education Centers Ad-
dress Medication Issues Affecting Older Adults, 107 PUB. HEALTH REP. 37, 38 (1992). See
generally Michael D. Greenberg, Treatment Implications of Psychiatric Comorbidity, in
FROM PLACEBO TO PANACEA: PUTTING PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS TO THE TEST 57 (Seymour Fisher
& Roger P. Greenberg eds., 1997).
20. Jemigan, supra note 18, at 241; Champion, supra note 19, at 900.
21. David E. Gross, Presumed Dangerous: California's Selective Policy of Forcibly
Medicating State Prisoners with Antipsychotic Drugs, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483, 484 & n. 1
(2002) (citing Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1310 (1987)
(defining antipsychotic drugs)).
22. Id. at 484. See also ELYN R. SAKS, REFUSING CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE
RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 109 (2002) (noting that psychotropic drugs are commonly
seen as "mind-altering" and "thought-suppressing," making them highly suspect, while con-
trary opinion holds that the drugs achieve psychological normalization).
23. Gross, supra note 2 1, at 486. See generally Marshall B. Kapp, Nursing Home Re-
straints and Legal Liability, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 1 (1992).
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to patients a judicial hearing in order to determine their competency to re-
fuse medication administered by the state.24 Until 2000, there had been no
question that this right also extended to state prisoners challenging orders to
administer antipsychotic medication.25
However, in a challenge to the constitutionality of a prisoner's right of
refusal, the California Court of Appeal determined in April 2000 that pris-
oners who are found not guilty by reason of insanity, and subsequently
committed, no longer have a right to such a competency hearing.26 The
court held that the initial verdict constitutes a determination of dangerous-
27ness, which thereby precludes a right to a judicial hearing.
In seeking to protect the safety of its citizens, the State is often allowed
to compromise the interests of the individual in order to protect the public
good.28 It is for this very reason-a need for protection-that justification
for forcible medication is found on either an emergency or dangerousness
standard.29
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was recently con-
fronted with a unique issue: could the government forcibly medicate a men-
tally ill criminal defendant in order to render him competent to stand trial
for murder without violating the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause?
30
The court held in the affirmative, declaring that the government may medi-
cate such an unwilling defendant if, and only if, the defendant has been
charged with a serious (e.g., dangerous) crime and the medication is neces-
sary to render him competent to stand trial.
31
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 2000); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5332(b) (West
1998 & Supp. 2003).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600.
26. In re Locks, 79 Cal. App. 4th 890, 892, 897 (2000).
27. Id. at 896-97.
28. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962) (discussing state
protection of public interests in the context of eminent domain proceedings). See generally
Penney Lewis, Procedures That Are Against the Medical Interests of Incompetent Adults, 22
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 609-10 (2002) (discussing state action in determining levels of
burdens that can be imposed on incompetent subjects of therapeutic versus non-therapeutic
research).
29. See Cochran v. Dysart, 965 F.2d 649, 650 (8th Cir. 1992). See also SAKS, supra
note 22, at 3 (noting that the key to finding a humane policy is to strike a balance between
paternalism and autonomy in a rational way that does not have the effect of discriminating
against the mentally ill).
30. See United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
31. Id at 880-83. In June 2003, the Supreme Court decided the case of Sell v. United
States, 123 S. Ct. 1274 (2003), and sought to resolve the issue of forcibly medicating a de-
fendant too mentally ill to stand trial. See 123 S. Ct. at 2178. Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Stephen G. Breyer found involuntary medication, by use of antipsychotic drugs, to be
valid constitutionally if it furthered significantly an "important" government objective. Id. at
2185. Specifically, the drugs must be "substantially likely" to render the defendant compe-
2004]
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The final rules for the application of OBRA '87, promulgated by the De-
partment of Health and Human Services in 1991, raised expectations of
sweeping reform in the nursing home industry.32 The final rules ranged
from the implementation of Congressional intent to protect the rights of
nursing home residents to freedom from "any physical or chemical re-
straints imposed for purposes of discipline or convenience. ' '33 The regula-
tions clarify that freedom from restraint also encompasses the resident's
right to refuse treatment.34 This seemingly broad mandate defers to state
law in one important respect: in the case of a resident determined to be in-
competent under state law, an individual is appointed by the State to exer-
cise the rights of the resident and to act on his behalf.35 Moreover, in re-
sponse to public comments, the agency further clarified that it defers
entirely to state law regarding the degree of process necessary to deprive a
patient of these rights, "tak[ing] into account the fact that gradations of in-
capability exist to which the States have adopted.., graduated remedies. 36
Although OBRA '87 enumerates specific rights for nursing home resi-
dents, it leaves to the states the task of selecting the residents to whom they
are due. Therefore, the applicability of OBRA '87 to a specific resident re-
fusing treatment is contingent on whether the individual has been deemed
competent to do so as a matter of state law.
37
tent and "substantially unlikely" to produce effects that interfere with a defendant's ability to
receive a fair trial. Id. at 2184-85. These rules would apply to trial-competency determina-
tions "whether the offense is a serious crime against the person or a serious crime against
property." Id. Procedures for balancing the new criteria are notably absent in the Court's
decision. See generally Stephan Beyer, Madness and Medicine: The Forcible Administra-
tion of Psychotropic Drugs ch. 7, in 2 ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A
BRAVE NEW WORLD (George P. Smith, I ed., 1982).
32. Cf Don Colbum, Untying the Elderly; New Rules Seek to Limit Overuse of Re-
straints in Nursing Homes, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1991, at Z7 ("The issue of physical and
chemical restraints ... is 'a key to unlock the bad box we've been in' with nursing homes
'and to open up the door to a whole new approach, where a person is viewed as someone
with life to live."'), available at 1991 WL 2156413.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(ii)
(West 2003). A "Bill of Rights" for nursing home patients was also enacted under OBRA
'87, mandating care facilities to refrain fiom using "verbal, sexual, physical or mental abuse,
corporal punishment, and involuntary seclusion." See 42 C.F.R. § 483.13(b) (2003). An-
other section sets out minimum "quality of life" standards, requiring that each facility "must
provide a safe, clean, comfortable, and homelike environment." See 42 C.F.R. §
483.15(h)(1) (2003).
34. 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(b)(4) (2003).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(1)(C); 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(a)(3). See also 42 U.S.C.A. §
1395i-3(c)(1)(C).
36. Medicare and Medicaid; Requirements for Long Term Care Facilities, 54 Fed. Reg.
5316, 5320 (codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 405, 442, 447, 483, 488-89, 498), available at 1989
WL 280638.
37. See Scott, supra note 17, at 116.
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II. THE SOURCE OF THE RIGHT TO REFUSE:
THE COMMON LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. Substantive Rights
In Davis v. Hubbard," the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio outlined the issues and arguments that subsequent courts
would examine in grappling with the issue of whether patients in a state
mental hospital have a right to consent to the administration of medica-
tion.39 The court concluded that the State did not have the unlimited power
to administer psychotropic medication "to all persons confined in institu-
tions for the mentally ill without limitation. ' 40
In an action challenging conditions at the Lima State Mental Hospital,
plaintiffs asserted that the State must obtain a patient's informed consent
before subjecting him to psychotropic drugs.41 In support of this argument,
plaintiffs claimed that the compulsory treatment implicated three legal
rights: (1) the patient's interest in bodily integrity and personal dignity; (2)
the patient's interest in independent decision-making; and, (3) the patient's
interest in maintaining his ability to think and communicate freely.
42
38. 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
39. Id. at 925. See James A. King, An Involuntary Mental Patient's Right to Refuse
Treatment with Antipsychotic Drugs: A Reassessment, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135, 1150 (1987)
(arguing that a qualified right to refuse treatment is more consistent with the mental health
system as a whole). See also SAKS, supra note 22, at 95-109 (analyzing the typical motives
for refusal, presented in Table 1 on page 97; also pointing out that health care providers of-
ten surmise that disturbed patients' reasons for refusing psychiatric are tainted by mental ill-
ness and thus invalid, even though these reasons are essentially the same as those that pa-
tients with physical illnesses provide).
40. Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 937.
41. Id. at 925. Originally, the issue before the court was whether the state must obtain
the patient's informed consent prior to administration of psychotropic drugs, convulsive
therapy, or behavior modification programs. The latter two, however, were mooted by the
enactment of Ohio Revised Code § 5122.271 (2000), which required "fully informed, intelli-
gent, and knowing consent... and the right to refuse for... (1) Surgery; (2) Convulsive
therapy; (3) Major aversive interventions; (4) Sterilization; (5) Any unusually hazardous
treatment procedures; [and] (6) Psycho-surgery." Id. at n.3.
42. Id. at 930. Moreover, as a practical matter, a patient's interest in avoiding forced
administration ofpsychotropic drugs is substantial. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210
(1990) (dealing with the rights of prison inmates to refuse forced administration of psycho-
tropic drugs). Although the drugs' purpose is to alter the chemical balance in a patient's
brain and thereby lead to beneficial changes, these drugs can have serious, even fatal, side
effects. Id. at 229. One such side effect is acute dystonia, a "severe involuntary spasm of
the upper body, tongue, throat, or eyes." Id. at 229-30. Other side effects include akathesia
(motor restlessness); neuroleptic malignant syndrome (a potentially deadly cardiac dysfunc-
tion); and tardive dyskinesia (a sometimes irreversible neurological disorder that is charac-
terized by involuntary uncontrollable muscle movements, especially of the face). Id. at 230.
2004]
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In its analysis of the first interest, the court examined the history of the
common law, observing that "there is... no right which is older than a per-
son's right to be free from unwarranted personal contact. 'A3 The court fur-
ther noted that this "'violation of the person or... breaking of the close' is
"the wrong upon which the modem tort of battery is premised." 44 Thus, li-
ability based on battery is not denied even though the touching was for the
benefit of the patient or was otherwise harmless. 45 The court also cited con-
stitutional authority, noting many references to the "inviolability of the per-
son, '  emanating from the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment,47 the
Eighth Amendment,48 and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.49
The corollary and second interest cited by plaintiffs was a person's inter-
est in making decisions about his body.50 The court saw this interest re-
flected in the common law tort concept of consent, a necessary prerequisite
for nonemergency treatment by a physician.5 1 The principle underlying this
doctrine is that only the patient has the right to weigh the risks associated
with a particular course of treatment. 52 The court then extended this ration-
ale to decisions that a person is constitutionally entitled to make. 53 Analo-
gizing the patient's right in the case at bar to a criminal defendant's right to
43. Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 930. Indeed, the court notes that as early as the middle of the
thirteenth century, English law allowed monetary recovery for unpermitted contact with a
person through the writ of trespass vi et armis. Id. (citing F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF
ACTION AT COMMON LAW 40, 43, 53 (1971 ed.)).
44. Id. at 931 (quoting F. HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 14, at 36 (1933
ed.); citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1934); citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 13, 18, 19 (1965)).
45. Id. (citing Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956)).
46. Id. (citing Union Pac. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
47. Id. (citing, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66 (1968); Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966)).
48. Id. (citing, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
49. Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 931 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-74 (1977);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 174 (1952)). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Douglas applied similar reasoning in Griswold, recognizing emana-
tions from various constitutional rights. Id. at 485. These fundamental guarantees, when
taken together, created a penumbral zone of privacy, within which the Supreme Court lo-
cated the right of married couples to use contraception. Id.
50. Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 931.
51. Id. (noting that treatment rendered without the patient's informed consent is action-
able as battery). See also Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562, 564 (1906) (forbidding violation of a
patient's bodily integrity by surgeon operating without consent); Mohr v. Williams, 104
N.W. 12, 13, 16 (1905) (imposing liability for the nonconsensual performance of an other-
wise beneficial surgical procedure).
52. Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 932. However, this rationale assumes that the patient is com-




representation by counsel, the court observed that the patient, much like a
defendant, must bear the personal consequences of his decision.
5 4 There-
fore, the patient must be as free to accept or refuse treatment as a defendant
is free to retain or refuse counsel. 5  The court reasoned further that, al-
though the Supreme Court does not recognize a specific right to refuse psy-
chotropic drugs, it does recognize the individual's right to make intimate
decisions which fundamentally affect him.
5 6
The third right relied upon by plaintiffs implicates the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of speech, a provision that protects not only a per-
son's interest in communicating but also a person's interest in thinking
without regard to the subject matter of his thoughts.
57 According to this
theory, government action that directly affects mental processes would be
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
58 The court, however, rele-
gated this theory to dicta by noting that a person's freedom to use his mind
as he wishes need not rely on the First Amendment.
5 9 Indeed, "'the power
to control men's minds' is 'wholly inconsistent' not only with the philoso-




56. Id. at 932-33 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)). According to
Davis:
It indeed "would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if... a provision of
constitutional law, always understood to have been adopted for protection and se-
curity of the right of the individual as against the government" (citation omitted),
neither recognized the individual's interest in security nor, more importantly, his
interest in being an individual. Perhaps no action directly affects this latter inter-
est more than the State's attempt to decide for the patient whether he must take
psychotropic drugs. If a patient has no protected interest in his body, in how his
body will be used, and how his mind will work, in almost every sense of the word
the patient ceases to be an individual and instead becomes a creature of the State.
Only when a person is granted a certain sphere of autonomy does that person be-
come an individual.
Id. at n.21.
57. Id. at 933. See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). In Wooley, Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, questioned whether the states may constitutionally require
an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it
on his private property for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public. Id.
at 713. In its analysis, the court began with the broad proposition that the First Amendment
guarantees the right of freedom of thought. Id. at 714 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943)). The Court then identified the right to speak and the concomitant
right to refrain from speaking as components of this concept of "individual freedom of
mind." Id. See generally Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A
First Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1989).
58. Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 933.
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1964)).
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Thus, this interest flows from a much broader source than any specific con-
stitutional provision.
The State presented two arguments in support of its contention that it had
the power to medicate all persons who are mentally ill and confined to an
institution. The first was based on the state police power to prevent a pa-
tient from harming himself or others within the hospital. 6' The second
sought to justify compulsory treatment under the State's parens patriae
powers.62
The court dismissed the first argument, observing that the challenge did
not attack forced treatment where necessary to protect the safety of others.63
Rather, according to the court the question at hand concerned when the
danger of injury to the patient or other patients is sufficient to justify forced
administration of a mind-altering drug to a competent patient who refuses to
give consent.64 In light of the significant invasion of fundamental rights
represented by the forced administration of psychotropic drugs, the court
reasoned that the risk of danger which the State has a legitimate interest in
protecting against must be sufficiently grave and immediate, not merely a
remote possibility.65 Thus, the court concluded that, as a constitutional
minimum, the State must have probable cause to believe that the patient is
presently violent and constitutes a danger to himself or others before it may
administer drugs over the patient's objections.66
In response to the State's second argument the court rejected, as a pre-
liminary matter, the State's assumption that its parens patriae power en-
abled it to drug all mentally ill persons confined to an institution. 67 Reason-
ing that a relationship between mental illness and incompetency is not
61. Id. at 934 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979); Runnels v. Rosen-
dale, 499 F.2d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1974); Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir.
1978) (noting that the State has a constitutional obligation to protect prisoners in its custody
against assault by other prisoners)).
62. Id. at 935.
63. Id. at 934.
64. Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 934.
65. Id. at 934. Accord Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). In Johnson, the Supreme
Court struck down a Texas statute prohibiting flag burning despite the insistence of the State
that the statute promoted the valid state interest of preventing breaches of the peace. See id.
at 407-08. As in Davis, the Court held that the likelihood of such breaches were remote, and
that the implicated right (here free expression rather than bodily integrity) was fundamental.
Id. at 406.
66. Davis, 506 F. Supp at 935. See also Marvin S. Swartz, What Constitutes a Psychiat-
ric Emergency: Clinical and Legal Dimensions, 15 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 57
(1987) (discussing the instances in which drugs may be administered over patients' objec-
tions).
67. Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 935.
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necessary,68 the court found that mental illness is no basis for compelled
treatment.69 Accordingly, mere residence in a mental hospital cannot justify
forced administration of psychotropic drugs absent a determination that the
patient is not capable of rationally deciding what is good for him. 70 The
court held that no legitimate state interest justifies the State's administration
of psychotropic drugs absent the informed consent of the competent patient,
unless the patient presents a danger to himself or others in the institution. 7'
B. The Process Accorded
Davis presents a broad view of issues and arguments arising in drug re-
fusal cases with respect to the existence of a patient interest under the
common law and the Constitution. However, with respect to the criteria for
determining when forced medication is appropriate and how much consid-
eration is necessary in this finding, Davis raises more questions than it an-
swers. Rennie v. Klein,72 though less exhaustive in its treatment of the
sources of a patient's interest in refusing medication, fills in many gaps left
by Davis with respect to the specific rights of patients with varying degrees
of competency and the due process that must be afforded them.
1. Rennie v. Klein: The District Court Decision
In Rennie a class of patients in five New Jersey state-owned mental hos-
pitals filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.73 The patients sought to
enjoin the hospitals and their staff from forcibly administering drugs to
them without a hearing.74 As a preliminary matter, the court accorded the
68. Id. (noting that the premise of this position is that incompetency, not mental illness,
renders a patient unable to provide informed consent to medication); Robert Plotkin, Limit-
ing the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. REv.
461, 490, 496 (1977))).
69. Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 935-36 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 427).
70. Id. at 936.
71. Id. at 938. At this point in the opinion the court proceeded with a due process analy-
sis, noting that the right to refuse treatment is not absolute. Id. Therefore, the procedures by
which a state determines forced treatment must comply with the procedural protections of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The court offered general observations in the form of dicta
as to the rights of the refusing patient:
[T]his Court believes the State should provide the patient some kind of hearing
before compelling the patient to take psychotropic drugs .... Due process, of
course, requires an impartial decision-maker, but the Court does not believe that
this means the decision-maker must be a judge or even a lawyer.
Id. at 938-39.
72. 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D. N.J. 1979), modified and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3rd Cir.
1981) (en banc), vacated by 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
73. Id. at 1296.
74. Id. In fact, prior to the district court decision, the State of New Jersey enacted legis-
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patients a qualified right to refuse treatment, thus requiring some level of
procedural due process before the forcible administration of drugs.75 The
question, therefore, concerned what procedures were required, at a mini-
mum, to protect the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs in such situa-
76tions.
The court deemed several requirements essential as a matter of law.
First, the hospital must obtain specific, written consent from patients before
they are medicated with a psychotropic drug.77 In the case of voluntary pa-
tients, the refusal is final and the hospital cannot proceed further.78 How-
ever, the informed refusal of an involuntarily committed patient may be
overridden, as this type of patient's right to refuse is not absolute.79 Sec-
ond, a neutral, independent decision-maker must be provided in the treat-
ment context.80 Third, because of the possibility of excessive costs to the
State without a significant decrease in the risk of erroneous determinations,
the court refused to require a formal hearing or even the presence of an at-
torney for forcible drug administrations. 81
The court proceeded to recognize violations in several areas, most nota-
bly the hospital's policy of limiting the review of a physician's decision to
forcibly medicate to informal hearings held before the treatment team and
hospital medical director.82 The court reasoned that this policy was inap-
propriate because institutional pressures would make it impossible for the
medical director to have the sufficient independence required by due proc-
ess. 83 The court issued a preliminary injunction mandating that the hospital
lation regulating treatment of the mentally ill. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 848 (3rd
Cir. 1981) (en banc). The legislation provided for the right to participate in planning of
treatment by the patient as permitted by the patient's condition. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §
30:4-24.1 (West 2001)). New Jersey also promulgated rules that guaranteed patients the
right to be "free from unnecessary or excessive medication" in addition to the right to not
have medication "used as a punishment, for the convenience of staff, [or] as a substitute for a
treatment program." Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN § 30:4-24.2(d)(1) (West 2001)).
75. Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1307. The court, however, noted an unqualified right of re-
fusal for patients who have been voluntarily committed to the mental hospital. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1308.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1308.
82. Id. at 1310 (finding that the hospital had prescribed an unduly narrow review process
of physicians' decisions to forcibly medicate, one that involved only informal hearings be-
fore the treatment team and hospital medical director). In addition, the court found that the
hospital failed to inform patients adequately of their rights and the side effects of many
drugs, and that the hospitals had not sought the required written consent to specific drug
therapy. Id. at 1309-10.
83. Id. at 1310.
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develop consent forms for patients to sign before they are prescribed psy-
chotropic drugs.84 The court further ordered the appointment of a patient
advocate to assist patients who wish to refuse medication and prescribed the
appointment of an independent psychiatrist to review the decisions to forci-
bly medicate involuntary patients.85
Henceforth, under this judicial determination, and depending upon pa-
tient status, several levels of procedure are to be followed. The patient ad-
judged legally incompetent could be medicated without written consent,
provided that the patient advocate was notified and the medication was oth-
erwise allowable under state law.86 This order also prescribed the same pro-
cedure for patients certified functionally incompetent by the treating physi-
cian and would, by necessity, involve a determination by the physician that
the patient, although not declared incompetent under state law, was unable
to provide knowledgeable consent to treatment.87 Voluntary patients had an
absolute right to refuse medication in nonemergent situations and any
review of a patient refusal brought before the independent psychiatrist re-
quired at least five days notice between the patient's first refusal and the
hearing.8 The patient was permitted to have an attorney and independent
psychiatrist at the hearing. 89 In addition, all hospital records were to be
made available to the independent psychiatrist at the hearing, who was also
permitted to examine the patient. 90 While no cross-examination was re-
quired, the independent psychiatrist could request the appearance of hospi-
tal employees. 91 Finally, the order required the independent psychiatrist to
issue a written opinion explaining the basis of his determination.
92
84. Id. at 1313.
85. Id. As of January 7, 1980, no patient over age eighteen could be medicated without
signing a consent form, regardless of whether he or she was voluntarily or involuntarily
committed. Id. However, when a treating psychiatrist certified that an immediate emer-
gency situation existed, medication could be forcibly administered for seventy-two hours.
Id.
86. Id. at 1314. The patient advocate could, in his discretion, initiate a review of the de-
cision to medicate with the independent psychiatrist.





92. Id. at 1314-15.
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2. The Third Circuit: Residual Liberty Interests and the Least Intrusive
Means Standard
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
agreed that plaintiffs had a liberty interest that was infringed by compulsory
medication. 93 First, the court found that, in determining that a state statute
does not create a liberty interest, a liberty interest found directly in the
United States Constitution may nonetheless exist. 94 Responding to the de-
fendants' argument that because there was no due process under New Jer-
sey law none was due, the court concluded that liberty interests may spring
from the Constitution itself and can be recognized without regard to state
law.
95
Second, the court revisited the issue of whether an individual's freedom
to refuse medication is extinguished by involuntary civil commitment. 96
Rejecting the State's argument that involuntary commitment takes away all
aspects of a person's liberty interest, the court found that "the patient 're-
tain[s] a residuum of liberty that would be infringed' by compulsory medi-
cation 'without complying with minimum requirements of due process. ' ' '97
In its decision, the court reasoned that "'even when pursuing a legitimate
93. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 838.
94. Id. at 842.
95. Id. (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes,
427 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1976)). Defendants analogized the interests of the patients with those
of inmates seeking to be incarcerated in a particular prison. Id. Similarly, the court rejected
plaintiff's reliance on the Eighth Amendment as a bar to forced medication as cruel and un-
usual punishment. Id. at 844. Clearly, this court sees much to distinguish the interests of
patients who have been deprived of certain liberty interests for treatment purposes from the
interests of inmates who have been deprived of liberty for punishment purposes.
96. Id. at 843. Much as one with a terminal illness may refuse treatment or ask that it be
withdrawn, in psychiatry what is known as the Ulysses contract allows one to refuse medica-
tion if she reaches a state of incompetence and is unable to refuse. The central issue then
becomes how to medically determine when such a person is incompetent to choose. In the
context of a civil commitment, the patient declares that she "does not want to be committed
even if she becomes incompetent to decide on hospitalization." Drawing its context from the
sage of Ulysses who instructed his crew of sailors to bind him to the ship's mast and not re-
lease him when the sirens sang, within psychiatry the Ulysses contract is but a form of pater-
nalism that allows one's prior self to choose for the current self. In a very real way, it vali-
dates the principle of autonomy and allows for a "more mastery over one's fate." See SAKS,
supra note 22, at 73, 202-204, 209, n.37. See generally John A. Robertson, Paying the Alli-
gator: Precommitment Theory in Bioethics and Constitutional Law, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1729
(2003); Paul F. Stavis, The Nexum: A Modest Proposalfor Self-Guardianship by Contract: A
System of Advance Directives and Surrogate Committees-at-Large for the Intermittently
Mentall Ill, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1 (1999).
97. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 843 (quoting Vitek v. Jones 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980)).
[Vol. 13
"Just Say No!"
interest, a State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitu-
tionally protected liberty"' interests,98 and concluded that this "least intru-
sive means" standard, although not prohibiting all intrusions, "requires
avoidance of those which are unnecessary or whose cost benefit ratios,
weighed from the patient's standpoint, are unacceptable." 99
After delving into the scope of the constitutional right to refuse treat-
ment, the appeals court addressed the issue of whether the due process safe-
guards imposed by the district court injunction were proper. 100 In doing so,
the court observed that "[d]espite detailed mechanisms established by [New
Jersey Administrative] Bulletin 78-3, the district court held that the proce-
dures failed to meet due process standards." 10 1 As the appeals court noted,
the district court expanded on the State's requirements, outlining the neces-
sary procedures in the injunction. 102 Therefore, in deciding whether the dis-
trict court acted properly, the Third Circuit framed the scope of its inquiry
in much narrower terms, asking whether the procedures established by the
State of New Jersey satisfied due process.10 3 The court determined that a
federal court should not substitute its judgment for that of state legislatures
and executive authorities absent a state's failure to meet constitutional stan-
dards.' 4
In light of its narrow construction of a federal court's scope of review, it
should come as no surprise that after the application of Matthews v. El-
dridge,'°5 the Third Circuit found that the district court had overstepped its
authority. 10 6 The Third Circuit concluded that the district court "erred in
engrafting its own procedures onto the requirements set out in [New Jersey]
Administrative Bulletin 78-3," reasoning that deficiencies in due process
provided to patients should be remedied by enforcing the pre-existing state
regulations, not by providing additional requirements. 
107
3. Rennie v. Klein on Remand: The Professional Judgment Standard
More than a year later, Rennie v. Klein returned to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, on remand from the Supreme
98. Id. at 846 (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973)).
99. Id. at 847.
100. Id. at 848.
101. Id. at 849.
102. Id.
103. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 849-50.
104. Id. at 850.
105. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
106. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 851.
107. Id. at 851.
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Court.108  At this point, the issues were refined to present one question:
what standard should be applied to determine whether a decision to override
a patient's refusal was constitutional? 109 In the first Rennie appellate deci-
sion, the court of appeals applied a least intrusive means standard, holding
that "[t]he means chosen to promote the state's substantial concerns must be
carefully tailored to effectuate those objectives with minimal infringement
[on the patient's] protected interests."1 10
In Rennie the Third Circuit applied the same standard it set forth in Ro-
meo v. Youngberg, a case involving the physical restraint of a mentally re-
tarded patient in a state institution."' 1 However, while Rennie was still
pending, the Supreme Court vacated the Romeo decision and held that the
appropriate standard only required courts to make certain that the staff of an
institution exercised professional judgment. 1 2 Since the Supreme Court
eliminated the least intrusive means standard, Rennie was remanded to the
Third Circuit specifically for reconsideration in light of Youngberg's less
stringent "professional judgment" standard.1 3
Nonetheless, on remand the Third Circuit reached the same result using
the new standard imposed by the Supreme Court.' 14 The court held that
"antipsychotic drugs may be constitutionally administered to an involuntar-
ily committed mentally ill patient whenever, in the exercise of professional
judgment, such an action is deemed necessary to prevent the patient from
endangering himself or others."' 15 However, in its decision the court stated
that "[t]he elimination of the concept of 'least intrusive means' from this
analysis does not ... require that any change be made in the decree portion
of [its] en banc opinion, which held that New Jersey procedures were ade-
quate in implementing the rights of the mentally ill.
116
Rennie was not the only refusal case that came before the United States
Supreme Court in 1982. Rogers v. Okin1 17 was proceeding through the First
108. 720 F.2d 266 (3rd Cir. 1983).
109. See id. at 268.
110. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 846 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965)).
111. 644 F.2d 147, 154 (3rd Cir. 1980), vacated by 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
112. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322.
113. Rennie, 720 F.2d at 268. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22 (adopting the "profes-
sional judgment" standard).
114. Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 270. In fact, the new reasoning makes even more persuasive the Third Cir-
cuit's position that the New Jersey state regulations were adequate because the new standard
mandated by the Supreme Court is less stringent.




Circuit at the same time. In fact, the Supreme Court issued the Youngberg
and Rogers opinions on the same day.'
18
III. ROGERS V. OKIN AND ITS PROGENY: STATE CREATED INTERESTS
PROTECTED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. State Law Explicitly Provides a Judicial
Determination of Competency
In Rogers, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was
asked to determine under what circumstances a state official may administer
psychotropic drugs to mental patients without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment." 19 The First Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that
mental patients enjoy constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interests
in deciding whether to submit to drug therapy.120 The reviewing court also
affirmed the trial court determination that an involuntary commitment under
state law provides no basis for an inference of legal incompetency. 121 How-
ever, the reviewing court reversed the lower court's decision on the circum-
stances under which the State's interests might override the patient's liberty
interests.1
22
The United States Supreme Court, in a brief opinion, never reached the
merits of the issue on appeal because of the intervening decision of a Mas-
sachusetts state court on the same issue: whether an involuntarily commit-
ted mental patient has a constitutional right to refuse treatment with anti-
psychotic drugs.123 Because the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
delineated a broader liberty interest than those protected by the Federal
Constitution, the Supreme Court declined to decide the federal constitu-
tional issue. 124 The Court observed that where a state confers greater pro-
cedural protection of liberty interests than the Constitution of the United
States, the Constitution does not control and need not be looked to as a
source of the legal rights and duties of persons within the state. 125 There-
fore, the Supreme Court vacated the First Circuit decision and remanded for
118. Both decisions were issued on June 18, 1982.
119. Rogers, 634 F.2d at 653. Clearly the court here has already established that the pa-
tient has a protected interest and the constitutional source of that interest. The First Circuit is
trying to delineate the situations that might override those of the patient.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 658.
122. Id. at 659-60. See generally SAKS, supra note 22, at ch. 5.
123. See In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981).
124. Mills, 457 U.S. at 305.
125. Id. at 300.
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reconsideration in light of the holding of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts. 
126
On remand, the First Circuit observed that the Federal Due Process
Clause "provides procedural protections for state-created substantive liberty
interests."1 27 According to the First Circuit, the enumerated provisions of
Massachusetts law, as outlined in Rogers v. Commissioner, required a judi-
cial determination of incompetence prior to forced medication.' 28 In addi-
tion, the First Circuit held that the rights outlined therein created a legiti-
mate, objective expectation and were thus entitled to the procedural
protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
129
Furthermore, the court held that because the procedures listed by the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts were articulated in "explicitly man-
datory language" and were coupled with specific substantive predicates, it
could only conclude that the State had created a protected liberty interest in
the procedures as well as in the substantive rights. 30
126. Id. at 306. Indeed, the Massachusetts holdings go well beyond the federal constitu-
tional minimum as outlined in Rennie v. Klein. After the issuance of In re Guardianship of
Roe, The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit requested clarification of the
issues of state law by certifying several issues to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. See
Rogers v. Commissioner, 458 N.E.2d 308, 310 (1983). The decision, summarized here, out-
lines the extent of patient substantive and procedural rights under Massachusetts statutory,
regulatory and common law: (1) civil involuntary commitment of a person to a state mental
institution does not constitute a determination of incompetency to make treatment decisions,
id. at 312-14; (2) a patient declared mentally incompetent is entitled to a substituted judg-
ment treatment decision, involving consideration of (a) the patient's expressed treatment
preference, (b) his religious beliefs, (c) the impact of the decision on the patient's family, (d)
the probability of adverse side effects, (e) the prognosis without treatment, and (f) the prog-
nosis with treatment, id. at 318-19; (3) the State may invoke its police powers without prior
judicial approval only if the patient poses an imminent threat of harm to himself or others,
and only if there is no less intrusive alternative to antipsychotic drugs, id. at 321-22 & n.26;
(4) under its parens patriae power, the State may treat a patient against his will to prevent
immediate, substantial, and irreversible deterioration of a serious mental illness in cases
where even the smallest avoidable delays would be intolerable, id. at 322; (5) to continue
treatment in such a therapeutic emergency, the treating doctors must seek an adjudication of
incompetency and, if the patient is adjudicated incompetent, a substituted judgment treat-
ment plan, id; (6) the determination of incompetency must be made by a judge, not a doctor
or other state official, id at 313-18; (7) the judge must make the substituted judgment deci-
sion, providing adequate notice and opportunity to be heard to the parties, id. at 318; and, (8)
following the determination of the appropriate treatment plan, a guardian or the judge must
monitor the treatment to assure adherence with the substituted judgment treatment plan, id.
at 318 & n.20.
127. Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1984).
128. Id. at 8.




B. State Law Is Silent
In stark contrast to the holding of Rogers v. Okin, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia held in United States v. Leatherman
that due process did not require a judicial determination of incompetency
prior to forcible medication.' 3 ' The different holding in Leatherman can be
explained by the absence of any state law providing substantive rights and
procedures beyond those available in Rennie v. Klein. In light of this fact,
the only role of the court would be to balance the State's versus the pa-
tient's interests, as prescribed in Matthews v. Eldridge.'32 The Leatherman
court considered the interests of the government, the risks of erroneous de-
cisions, and the patient's liberty interest. 33 It further reasoned that requir-
ing the courts to address such issues would involve them in a "never-ending
controversy concerning medical judgments for which courts have neither
the institutional resources nor the necessary expertise."' 134 The court, there-
fore, concluded that the interests of the government strongly militated in fa-
vor of leaving a determination of competence to refuse treatment to the
hospital rather than to the courts.1
35
C. State Law Explicitly Provides Administrative
Determination of Competency
Project Release v. Prevost,136 a decision from the United State Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, dealt with a similar issue. However, in
Prevost, the procedures for refusal and later appeal were codified in the
New York Mental Hygiene Law and the New York Code of Rules and
Regulations. 137 Thus, the question in this case was the constitutionality of a
131. United States v. Leatherman, 580 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
132. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
133. Leatherman, 580 F. Supp. at 979.
134. Id.
135. Id. Leatherman is also clearly distinguishable from Rogers in that the facts in
Leatherman indicate that the patient in question had been adjudicated not guilty by reason of
insanity prior to his commitment by the court to St. Elizabeth's Hospital. See id. in 978.
The court, however, does not raise the issue of a possible difference in the measure of resid-
ual liberty interest attributed to a patient committed in civil or criminal proceedings. Indeed,
Leatherman is equally distinguishable from Rennie v. Klein on this basis as well.
136. Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
137. Id. at 967. The New York Code Rules and Regulations provides for a right to ob-
ject to treatment and subsequent review. Forcible treatment may not be administered to vol-
untary patients unless "'the treatment appears necessary to avoid serious harm to life or limb
of the patients themselves."' Id. (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 27.8(b)(l)-
(b)(2) (2003)). An involuntary patient may object to non-emergency treatment and has a
right to appeal. Id. at 967-68. However, before treatment may be administered over patient
objection, the objection must be reviewed by the head of the service. Id. at 968 (citing §
27.8(c)). His decision may be appealed to the facility director, id. (citing § 27.8(c), (e)(1)-
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statute rather than the conduct of the hospital staff.1 38 Appellants argued
that in nonemergent situations, the hospital may not administer psychotro-
pic medication to legally competent but involuntarily committed individuals
without a prior judicial commitment hearing.139 The court responded to this
argument by examining first the substantive, then the procedural issue.
140
For a delineation of the scope of the patient's substantive rights, the court
looked to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Mills v. Rogers, concluding that
involuntarily committed mental patients retain liberty interests protected di-
rectly by the Constitution and that those interests are implicated by the in-
voluntary administration of psychotropic drugs. 14' The court noted, how-
ever, that the substantive rights guaranteed in the Federal Constitution
define only a minimum protection, one that is encompassed by the state
regulatory provision allowing objection to treatment.1
42
In its examination of the procedural validity of the New York statute, the
court looked to Rennie for guidance as to the appropriate standard for as-
sessing whether the State had adequately protected an involuntarily
committed individual's interest in freedom from forced medication. 143 The
court, therefore, indicated that, in light of Youngberg, its function was to
"make certain that professional judgment ... was exercised."' 144 This stan-
dard reflected the balance between the legitimate interests of the State and
the rights of an involuntarily committed patient to be free from unreason-
able chemical restraints. 45 Thus, it would not be appropriate for the court
to ask which of several professionally acceptable choices should have been
made. 146
Applying this standard, the court looked to the New York State regula-
tions and noted provisions for three levels of review by medical personnel
(2)), and then to the regional director of the department, id (citing § 27.8(e)(3)). The object-
ing patient has the right to request an attorney to represent him. Id. (citing § 27.8(d)).
138. See id. at 963. In Project Release, a non profit patient rights advocacy group, Pro-
ject Release, filed suit on behalf of Carrie Greene, a patient a Creedmoor Psychiatric Center.
Id. at 963. The plaintiffs alleged that the standards and procedures in New York's Mental
Hygiene Law violated the patient's Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive and proce-
dural due process. Id. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on
all issues raised by the parties. See id. at 965 (citing Project Release v. Prevost, 551 F. Supp.
1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)).
139. Id. at 977.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 978-79 (citing Mills, 457 U.S. at 299 n.16 (1982)).
142. See Project Release, 722 F.2d at 979.
143. See id. at 979-80 (citing Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3rd Cir. 1981) (en banc),
vacated in light of Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
144. Id. at 980.
145. Id. (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22).
146. Id. (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322).
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other than the treating physician, as well as the right to counsel. 147 The
court further observed that, "due process requires an opportunity to be heard
and review of a decision to administer psychotropic medication." 148 This
determination, however, need not be judicial in nature. 149 Therefore, the
court concluded that the New York regulations satisfied both substantive
and procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.1
50
IV. STATE COURTS ADVOCATE PATIENTS' RIGHTS UNDER STATE
STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COMMON LAW
In Rivers v. Katz,151 the Court of Appeals of New York reached a differ-
ent conclusion than the Second Circuit reached in Project Release. New
York's highest court held that, under the State's parens patriae power, in-
voluntarily committed mental patients are entitled to a judicial determina-
tion of capacity prior to the forced administration of psychotropic drugs.
15 2
In Rivers, three involuntarily committed patients refused the administration
of psychotropic medication. The county court determined that they were
in need of involuntary care and treatment, and that their judgment was so
impaired that they were unable to understand the need for such care and
treatment.154 Therefore, the administrative review procedures prescribed by
the regulations of the Commissioner of Mental Health were implemented. 1
55
The objections of the patients were overruled and they were medicated with
various antipsychotic drugs. 156 The patients then initiated a declaratory
judgment proceeding against the Mental Health Commissioner and hospital,
seeking to enjoin the nonconsensual administration of psychotropic drugs
and to obtain a declaration of their common law and constitutional right to
refuse medication.
57
As a preliminary matter, the court stated that the common law of New
York recognizes that "every individual of adult years and sound mind has a
147. Id. at 980. See supra note 137 for a full discussion of provisions of the New York
State regulations.
148. Id. at 981.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
152. Id. at 343-44. See In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 500 N.E.2d 216, 221 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a patient had a liberty interest protected by due process in refus-
ing medication and was entitled to judicial hearing prior to medication).
153. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 339-40.
154. Id. at 339.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 339-40.
157. Id. at 340.
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right to determine what shall be done with his own body and the right to
control the course of his medical treatment."' 5 8 The court noted further that
these rights extend equally to the mentally ill, who should not be treated as
persons of lesser status because of their illness.'59 In response to the Com-
missioner's argument that committed mental patients are presumptively in-
competent to exercise the right to refuse, the court observed that neither
mental illness nor involuntary commitment constitutes a sufficient basis to
conclude a lack of mental capacity.160 The court concluded that mental ill-
ness does not result in a forfeiture of the patient's civil rights, including the
right to make decisions concerning one's own body.
161
The court recognized, however, that the right to reject treatment was not
absolute and would yield to the State's police or parens patriae power.
62
However, it viewed the scope of the State's police power very narrowly,
holding that it only applied where the patient presented a danger to himself
or other members of society and that medication could only be justified in
emergent situations. 63 Regarding the State's parens patriae interest, the
court ruled that in order to invoke the interest the individual must be inca-
pable of making a competent treatment decision on his own 64 This in-
volves a determination of competency, a function that the Rivers court
found to be uniquely judicial, not medical. 165 Therefore, the court held that
where the State's police power is not implicated and a patient refuses psy-
chotropic medication, due process requires a judicial determination of
whether the patient has the capacity to make a reasoned decision before
medication can be administered pursuant to the State's parens patriae
power.
166
The essential distinction between Rivers and Project Release v. Prevost
158. Id. at341.
159. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 341 (citing Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977)).
160. Id. at 341-42. See also Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 846 (3rd Cir. 1981) (en
banc), vacated by 458 U.S. 1199 (1982); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 658-59 (1st Cir.
1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939,
946 (3rd Cir. 1976); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 935 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rogers v.
Commissioner, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1983); In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d
40 (Mass. 1981). But see Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128, 129, 131 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
161. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 342. See generally Kathy L. Cerminara, The Class Action
Suit as a Method of Patient Empowerment in the Managed Care Setting, 24 AM. J.L. &
MED. 7 (1998).
162. See Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Rogers v. Commissioner, 459 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983); In re Guardian-
ship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981)).
166. Id. at 343-44.
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is the theory under which the plaintiffs asserted a right to be free from
treatment. In Project Release, the plaintiffs alleged violation of their rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 167 whereas in
Rivers the plaintiffs alleged violation of their rights under the common law
and the New York State Constitution. 68 Indeed, the different causes of ac-
tion, which resulted in different outcomes, illustrate the principle articulated
in Mills v. Rogers.169 This is an area of law where state law and state
constitutions provide greater protection for a patient's interest to be free
from forced medications than the constitutional minimum prescribed under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The dichotomy between decisions based on state law and those relying
on the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is further exemplified by
In re Orr, where the Appellate Court of Illinois held that an involuntarily
admitted patient may refuse medication unless, under the parens patriae
doctrine, he has been adjudicated incompetent in a separate proceeding.
170
In that case, following a hearing, an Illinois circuit court involuntarily
committed the patient, Jeffrey Orr, because of his mental illness and the
court's reasonable expectation that his illness would cause him to seriously
harm himself or others.' 7' The circuit court further authorized the State to
administer medication.172  In response, the Guardianship and Advocacy
Commission, appointed to represent Orr, filed an appeal on his behalf alleg-
ing that the court's order authorizing the State to administer medication as
167. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1983).
168. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 340.
169. Mills, 457 U.S. at 303 (noting that liberty interests found within the Constitution
cannot be determined independent of state law).
170. In re Orr, 531 N.E.2d 64, 73 (I11. App. Ct. 1988). This determination was the result
of the court's application of the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code
(Mental Health Code). See 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-107 (2002). The relevant section of
the Mental Health Code provides that:
An adult recipient of services or the recipient's guardian, if the recipient is under
guardianship, and the recipient's substitute decision maker, if any, must be in-
formed of the recipient's right to refuse medication. The recipient and the recipi-
ent's guardian or substitute decision maker shall be given the opportunity to re-
fuse generally accepted mental health or developmental disability services,
including but not limited to medication. If such services are refused, they shall
not be given unless such services are necessary to prevent the recipient from
causing serious and imminent physical harm to the recipient or others and no less
restrictive alternative is available. The facility director shall inform a recipient,
guardian, or substitute decision maker, if any, who refuses such services of alter-
nate services available and the risks of such alternate services, as well as the pos-
sible consequences to the recipient of refusal of such services.
405 III. Comp. Stat. 5/2-107(a).
171. Orr, 531 N.E.2d at 67.
172. Id.
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part of the involuntary admission was void for want of statutory author-
ity.
17 3
The Appellate Court of Illinois agreed. 174 Relying on Illinois statutory
law, the court noted that the parens patriae doctrine was inapplicable be-
cause the patient had not been adjudicated incompetent under the Illinois
Probate Act. 175 Furthermore, it noted that mere involuntary committal does
not imply a lack of competency under Illinois law. 176 The court also looked
to common law and constitutional theories to support its decision that the
trial court exceeded its statutory authority when it issued the order authoriz-
ing the State to forcibly medicate Mr. Orr.'
77
V. AMENDMENTS TO THE OLDER AMERICANS ACT OF 1965
The other statutory solution developed by Congress and incorporated by
amendment into the Older Americans Act of 1965 provides for the estab-
lishment of a long-term care ombudsman program by any state receiving
federal funds under Title III of the Act. 178 These amendments, rather than
outlining a right or providing a judicial remedy, set aside and grant federal
funds to states that implement a comprehensive long-term care ombudsman
program. 179 Thus, Congress has made the receipt of significant amounts of
federal funds conditional on a state's development and adherence to a com-
prehensive plan in compliance with the Act.'
80
Congress does not, however, provide for any cause of action by which a
resident of a long-term care facility can assert a right to have an ombuds-
173. Id. at 69-71.
174. Id. at 71.
175. Id. at 73 (citing 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11 a-3 (2002)).
176. Id. (citing 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2002)).
177. Orr, 531 N.E.2d at 73-74. The court noted that informed consent and the right to
refuse medical treatment were grounded in the common law right to be free of nonconsen-
sual bodily invasions, the individual liberty interest in bodily integrity, and the right to pri-
vacy protected by both the State and Federal Constitutions. See id. at 74 (citing Davis v.
Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 929-39 (N.D. Ohio 1980)). The court further looked to Mills v.
Rogers noting that patients, even those subject to involuntary hospitalization, retain liberty
interests to remain free from intrusions into body and mind. See id.
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 3021(c) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 3027(a)(9) (2000). See also 42
U.S.C.A. § 3021(c) (West 2003); 42 U.S.C.A. § 3027(a)(9) (West 2003). See supra note 13
for an account of the legislative history of these provisions.
179. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 3027(a).
180. See id. Congress employs this method in many other areas, essentially condition-
ing a grant of federal funds upon the recipient state or entity's agreement to comply with
regulatory framework. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000) (providing for the reimbursement of
patient's expenses at a nursing home through Title XIX of the Social Security Act, com-
monly known as Medicaid).
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man assist him in a refusal case.' 8 ' Indeed, the legislative history of the
most recent amendment to this provision omits any discussion of providing
either a right that might be enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983182 or any
other distinct cause of action. 183 Thus, it seems that the principal purpose of
this statute, in addition to improving the quality of care of residents in long-
term care facilities, is to gather information for the purpose of further poli-
cymaking. 1
84
In order for a facility resident to bring suit under this statute, a court
would need to discern an implied private cause of action in the language of
the statute or its legislative history. 85 Neither the explicit language of the
181. See generally § 3027(a).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action for the "deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" by any person acting "under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory." 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of
a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and must show that the al-
leged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See, e.g., West
v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981); Flagg Broth-
ers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978).
183. See H.R. 782, 106th Cong., 114 Stat. 2226 (2000).
184. See S. Rep. No. 100-136, at 54-56 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86673,
876. See also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-427, at 68-70 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 932, 938-40. The 1987 Senate Report discusses diverse issues including the
improvement of quality of care, availability of adequate legal counsel, conflicts of interest,
the disabled elderly and data collection. See S. Rep. No. 100-136, at 54-56. The 1987
House Conference Report reflects the determinations of the House, Senate, and the Confer-
ence Committee, discusses funding, and includes the submission of a report by the Commis-
sioner on Aging that detailed findings and recommendations of a study on the long-term care
ombudsman program. Most importantly, the conference report clarifies the duties of the
ombudsman to:
[R]esolve complaints by elaborating upon the nature of the complaints which are
to be investigated to include complaints relating to action, inaction, or decisions
of providers, or their representatives, of long-term care services, of public agen-
cies, or of social service agencies which may adversely affect the health, safety,
welfare, or rights of such residents.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-126, at 69.
185. The Supreme Court has suggested that four inquiries be made when deciding
whether a private remedy may be implied in a statute that contains no express provision:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted," . . . that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plain-
tiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, ei-
ther to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the un-
derlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state
law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropri-
ate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (citations omitted). See generally Cerminara, supra note
161; Phan, supra note 17.
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statute nor its legislative history reveal any congressional intent to afford
judicial relief to a facility resident. However, this does not imply that relief
should not be available at the state level. Indeed, to the extent that Con-
gress has achieved its goal of persuading the states to effectuate an om-
budsman program in order to advocate the rights of patients, states have en-
acted statutes and adjudicated the resulting cases. One such case, In the
Matter of Conroy,186 has been studied by legal commentators and has pro-
vided a subject for earnest debate regarding the appropriateness of such a
program.
VI. IN THE MATTER OF CONROY: ONE STATE'S IMPLEMENTATION OF A
LONG-TERM CARE OMBUDSMAN PROGRAM
In Conroy, the Supreme Court of New Jersey comprehensively addressed
the circumstances under which life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or
withdrawn from an incompetent, institutionalized, elderly patient with se-
vere and permanent mental and physical impairments and a limited life ex-
pectancy. 187 In its analysis, the court discussed the role of the Office of
Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly, as created by New Jersey
statute. 188 The provisions that the court saw as arguably implicated by a de-
cision to withhold or withdraw treatment were those charging the ombuds-
man with responsibility to prevent "abuse" of elderly patients. 89 These
186. In re Matter of Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
187. Id. at 1216. Although Ms. Conroy had been adjudicated incompetent, the court de-
voted significant attention to the important issues of what rights a competent patient has to
accept or reject medical care. Id. at 1221-26. Here, Justice Schreiber examined the patient's
interest in self determination from the perspective of common law tort theory and the federal
constitutional right of privacy. Id. at 1221-23. He then discussed countervailing societal
interests: preserving the particular patient's life, preserving the sanctity of all life, safeguard-
ing the integrity of the medical profession, and protecting innocent third parties who may be
harmed by the patient's treatment decision. Id. at 1223-25.
188. See id. at 1239-42. The Ombudsman Statute provides in pertinent part:
[I]t is the public policy of this State to secure for elderly patients, residents and
clients of health care facilities serving their specialized needs and problems, the
same civil and human rights guaranteed to all citizens; and that to this end there
should be established as an agency of the State Government the Office of the
Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly, to receive, investigate and resolve
complaints concerning certain health care facilities serving the elderly, and to ini-
tiate actions to secure, preserve and promote the health, safety and welfare, and
the civil and human rights, of the elderly patients, residents and clients of such fa-
cilities.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27G-1 (West 2001).
189. Id. at 1239. Pursuant to a 1983 amendment, the statute was enlarged to protect pa-
tients from abuse. "Abuse" in this instance was defined as "the willful infliction of physical
pain, injury or mental anguish; unreasonable confinement; or, the willful deprivation of ser-
vices which are necessary to maintain a person's physical and mental health." N.J. STAT.
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provisions were interpreted by the court as creating a vehicle for safeguard-
ing the rights of elderly, institutionalized, incompetent patients both to re-
ceive medical treatment and to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment un-
der certain circumstances.190
A. The Procedural Requisites
In light of the circumstances, the issue was whether a decision to termi-
nate life-sustaining medical treatment constituted "abuse" and thus con-
flicted with the intention of the Ombudsman Act. 91 The court held that it
did not, articulating the procedure necessary to justify a decision to with-
hold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent nursing
home resident. 192 The ombudsman plays an integral role in this process: a
person who believes that withholding life-sustaining treatment would effec-
tuate the wishes of the incompetent patient or would be in the "best inter-
ests" of the patient should notify the Office of the Ombudsman of the con-
templated action. 193 Any person with reason to suspect that withholding
treatment would be an abuse should likewise inform the ombudsman.1 94
After reviewing these notification requirements, the ombudsman gathers
evidence concerning the patient's condition from the attending physician
and nurses. 95 He then consults with two physicians who are unaffiliated
with the nursing home.196 Based on this information and, in some instances,
the concurrence of family members, the patient's guardian may withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment upon a good faith belief that it is
consistent with the patient's right to self-determination.1 97
B. Three Tests for Implementing Patient Self-Determination
In addition, the court discerned three possible tests that would substanti-
ate this good faith belief and thus justify the withholding of life-sustaining
ANN. § 52:27G-2a (West 2001).
190. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1239.
191. Id. at 1240.
192. Id. at 1241-42.
193. Id. at 1241. This notification may be undertaken by the guardian of the patient or
by another interested party such as a family member of an attending physician.
194. Id. at 1242.
195. Id.
196. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1242.
197. Id. at 1240. Compliance with the wishes of the now incompetent patient can be
achieved by: (1) proceeding with the course of action previously agreed upon by the then
competent patient; or, (2) in instances where the patient had expressed no clear wishes, bal-
ancing the burden of the patient's continued existence with any benefits pursuant to a limited
or pure objective test.
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treatment. The first is a subjective test, essentially effectuating a patient's
explicit intent not to receive life sustaining intervention. 98 This might be
embodied in a living will or evidenced by an oral directive to a family
member. 199 The second, a "limited-objective" test, provides that treatment
may be withdrawn or withheld when there is some trustworthy evidence
that the patient would have refused treatment and where the decision maker
is satisfied that the burdens of the patient's continued life outweigh any
benefits. 200 The third, a "pure objective" test, is simply a balancing test ap-
plied in the absence of any intent, either explicit or implied, by the pa-
tient."'
Clearly, Conroy addresses the somewhat unique situation in which the
ombudsman attempts to discern the intent of the patient with respect to life-
sustaining treatment. The Federal Long-Term Ombudsman Plan was most
likely drafted to address many other situations, including refusal of various
non-life-sustaining medications and other general self-determination issues.
Conroy does, however, provide some insight into the issues raised by this
type of program. Indeed, to the extent this case represents the extreme
situation in which a long-term care ombudsman program would be imple-
mented, it provides valuable information as to the issues that are implicated
by such regulation. Among these are questions of economy, deference to
the patient's family, and ultimately, the difficult task of creating a proce-
dure to determine the proper course of action for the incompetent elderly
patient who cannot speak for himself.
VII. RE-EVALUATING THE OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT
Despite the breadth of rights and the compliance, enforcement, and over-
sight measures provided for in OBRA, nursing home abuse and neglect
continues to rise.20 2 The General Accounting Office (GAO) has issued sev-
198. Id. at 1229.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1232.
201. Id. See also Alan Meisel, Barriers to Forgoing Nutrition and Hydration in Nursing
Homes, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 345-52 (1995) (discussing federal requirements for provid-
ing adequate nutrition and hydration under the Medicare/Medicaid programs).
202. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), PUB. No. GAO/HEHS-99-46, NURSING
HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL QUALITY
STANDARDS (Mar. 1999) [hereinafter ENFORCING FEDERAL QUALITY STANDARDS], available
at http://www.ascp.com/public/ga/gao-report.pdf; U.S. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.
(OIG), DHHS, PUB. No. OEI-02-98-00331, NURSING HOME SURVEY AND CERTIFICATION:
DEFICIENCY TRENDS (Mar. 1999), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-98-
00331 .pdf. The Committee on Government Reform reported that the percentage of nursing
home abuse violations has increased every year since 1996. In an effort to combat elder
abuse, U.S. Senators John Breaux and Orrin Hatch introduced The Elder Justice Act on Feb-
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eral reports on nursing home abuse and neglect since the passage and im-
plementation of OBRA. In January 1996, the GAO reported findings of
rampant fraud and abuse surrounding nursing home services and sup-
203plies.
Since July 1998, the GAO has identified and reported four key weak-
nesses in OBRA. First, state surveyors understated the extent of serious
care problems, which include "actual harm" to residents and the "immediate
jeopardy" of residents' health, safety, and lives.
204 This understatement is-
sue resulted from the procedural weaknesses and predictable timing of state
surveys of nursing homes. 205 Second, complaints remained uninvestigated
for weeks or months.20 6 Third, when deficiencies were in fact identified,
federal and state enforcement agencies did not ensure that they were ad-
dressed and permanently fixed.20 7 Fourth, federal oversight mechanisms
were limited in their range and effectiveness.
0 8
In its 2000 report, the GAO concluded that measures have been taken by
the federal government, the states, and the nursing home industry in an ef-
fort to alleviate OBRA shortcomings identified in the July 1998 GAO re-
port.20 9 The report qualified these measures by recognizing the time needed
to implement them and to determine their efficacy.
210 In March 2002, the
GAO issued a report analyzing the adequacy of the responsiveness of the
federal government, the states, and the nursing home industry, generally
concluding that "nursing home residents need both stronger and more im-
mediate protections. 211
Both state and federal efforts in combating elder abuse and nursing home
ruary 10, 2003. This proposed legislation would seek to better train workers to detect abuse
among senior citizens and, additionally, require FBI criminal background checks for nurs-
ing-home aides. These safeguards would enhance the long-term care ombudsman program
and establish an office of adult protection services. See S. 333, 108th Cong. §§ 104-05
(2003).
203. GAO, PUB. No. HEHS-96-18, FRAUD AND ABUSE: PROVIDERS TARGET MEDICARE
PATIENTS IN NURSING FACILITIES 2 (Jan. 1996), available at http://www.gao.gov.
204. Nursing Homes: Success of Quality Initiatives Requires Sustained Federal and
State Commitment: Testimony Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 106th Cong.
(2000) (statement of William J. Scanlon, Director, Health Financing and Public Issues,
Health, Education, and Human Services. Division) (published as GAO/T-HEHS-00-209)





209. Id. at 15.
210. Scanlon Testimony, supra note 204, at 15.
211. GAO, PUB. No. GAO-02-312, NURSING HOMES: MORE CAN BE DONE TO PROTECT
RESIDENTS FROM ABUSE 26 (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov.
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deficiencies have proven to be inadequate. 2 12 The far-sweeping federal leg-
islation of OBRA has been downsized by procedural inadequacies. State
initiatives are too limited and do not provide the national uniformity neces-
sary to address nursing home inadequacies.213 Both OBRA and various
state initiatives have focused on deterrence as a method of combating elder
abuse and inadequate care, but have had dismal results. 214 It is evident that
there is a need to refocus on prevention of elder abuse and the inadequate
treatment of the elderly by reevaluating the structure of contemporary nurs-
ing homes.215
A. Continuing Inadequacies
Of the nation's 17,000 nursing homes, 15,000 provide Medicare-covered
skilled nursing and rehabilitative care every year to 1.4 million Medicare
patients who have been discharged from acute care hospitals.216 Therefore,
an increase in federal funds would dramatically impact a vast amount of
nursing home facilities. Yet, the November 2002 GAO report concluded
that "increasing the Medicare payment rate was not effective in raising
nurse staffing. 217 These findings were based upon the 2001 and 2002 tem-
porary increase in Medicare payment, which expired on October 1, 2002.18
The analysis of the 2001 and 2002 data indicated that there was not a "sig-
nificantly higher nursing staff time after the increase to the nursing compo-
nent of Medicare's payment. ',2 19 Regardless of this report, increases in fed-
eral funding should be reinstated. Federal funding should be provided with
guidelines outlining how to appropriate the monies. It is precisely this
guidance mechanism that was lacking when Congress increased funding in
2000.
212. See Scanlon Testimony, supra note 204, at 1-2. See generally Marie-Therese Con-
nolly, Federal Law Enforcement in Long Term Care, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 230
(2001).
213. See Scanlon Testimony, supra note 204, at 2. See generally, Jennifer Gimler
Brady, Long-Term Care Under Fire: A Case For Rational Enforcement, 18 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1 (2001).
214. See Scanlon Testimony, supra note 204, at 1. See also ENFORCING FEDERAL
QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 202, at 3.
215. See Connolly, supra note 212, at 238 (noting that there are "many distinct players"
involved in the issue of long term care, not just law enforcement). See also Brady, supra
note 213, at 4 (noting that the difficulties posed to nursing homes by increased regulation is
compounded by an increase in litigation aimed at quality of care issues).
216. GAO, PUB. No. GAO-03-176, SKILLED NURSING FACILITIES: AVAILABLE DATA
SHOW AVERAGE NURSING STAFF TIME CHANGED LITTLE AFTER MEDICARE PAYMENT






It has been reported that ninety percent of nursing homes in the United
States are too under-staffed to provide basic care such as dressing, groom-
ing, feeding, and cleaning. 220 Without this basic care, nursing home resi-
dents are likely to suffer from blood-borne infections, dehydration, bed-
sores, malnutrition, and pneumonia.22' In addition to insufficient care,
nursing home residents are suffering from abuse by staff.
222 It has been re-
ported that approximately forty percent of nursing home staff admitted to
engaging in psychological abuse, and approximately ten percent admitted to
engaging in physical abuse of residents.223
The issues and problems of the nursing home industry are so urgent and
pervasive that if not dealt with immediately, America is certain to face a
crisis by 2030. The soaring elder population is on a collision course with
the rising incidence of elder abuse and inadequate care in nursing home fa-
cilities. The federal government has responded by passing OBRA, which
has resulted in the ineffective regulation of nursing homes, as demonstrated
by the increased incidence of nursing home abuse. State governments have
responded with indirect mechanisms, which have proven limited and inef-
fective. Federal and state efforts have focused on deterrence while ignoring
the causes of mistreatment in the nursing home setting. Rather, the focus
should be on prevention, with particular attention to nursing home staff and
a well-balanced working environment. Nursing homes are tremendously
under-staffed and lack the appropriate training necessary to provide quality
care in the modern day nursing home. Increased federal funding is manda-




A comparison of the outcomes in cases brought under state law and those
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution sheds some
light on the effect of the provision of OBRA '87, which defers the determi-
nation of competency and the concomitant right to refuse medication to
state law.224 Because the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a constitutional
220. Kimberly L. Intagliata, Comment, Improving the Quality of Care in Nursing
Homes: Class Action Impact Litigation, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2002). See also
the proposed Elder Justice Act, supra note 202.
221. Intagliata, supra note 220, at 1014.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1014-15.
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(1)(C) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(a)(3) (2003). See
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minimum of substantive and procedural process that must be afforded in all
situations, the OBRA '87 provision, incorporating relevant state law, cer-
tainly does not harm the interests of patients objecting to psychotropic
medication. In fact, as has been illustrated in Roger v. Okin on remand, the
Federal Due Process Clause provides procedural protection for state-created
substantive liberty interests. 5 Moreover, this protection extends to proce-
dural requirements where such limitations place substantive restrictions on
the actions of state officials.
226
Furthermore, as illustrated by the holdings in In re Orr227 and Rivers v.
Katz, 228 state law and constitutional provisions provide more compelling ar-
guments for full judicial proceedings in patient refusal cases. Thus, the
deference of OBRA '87 to state law on this issue would tend to expand the
substantive and procedural rights of residents in long-term care facilities to
successfully refuse the administration of psychotropic medication. Granted,
if OBRA '87 provided an explicit right to facility residents to refuse medi-
cation in all but the most extreme cases, the result would be a uniformly
high standard. Nevertheless, as a matter of policy, there are many reasons
for not doing so.
The legacy of recent right to refuse cases has been aptly characterized as
a conflict in which "the law is struggling to decide whether it is better social
policy to have judges make quasi-medical decisions or to have doctors
make quasi-judicial ones. 229  The reactions of members of the medical
community have been dispassionate. Dr. Alan Stone, the former president
of the American Psychiatric Association, described the ruling in Rogers v.
Okin as "the most impossible, inappropriate, ill-considered judicial decision
in the field of mental health law., 230 These objections seem to be based on
the concern of medical professionals about significant delay in treatment, a
disservice to the welfare of the patient, and the greater time commitment
required of the physician to consult with legal counsel and testify in
court.23  Rivers v. Katz has also received attention from the medical com-
also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i-3(c)(1)(C) (West 2003).
225. 738 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1984).
226. Id. at 7 (citing Parenti v. Ponte, 727 F.2d 21, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1984)).
227. See 531 N.E.2d 64, 75 (I1. 1988).
228. See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986).
229. Loren H. Roth, The Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment: Law and Medicine at
the Interface, 35 EMORY L.J. 139, 150 (1986).
230. Id. at 148 & n.30 (quoting NAT'L L.J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 2).
231. Marilyn J. Schmidt & Jeffrey L. Geller, Involuntary Administration of Medication
in the Community: The Judicial Opportunity, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 283,
283-84 (1989) (describing the reaction of the psychiatric community to the holding in
Rogers v. Commissioner, 390 Mass. 489 N.E.2d 308 (1983), the Massachusetts case that
provided the state law basis for the holding of Rogers v. Okin, as remanded by the Supreme
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munity. 232 In a recent analysis of the impact of this decision, one study
concluded that the rate of refusal in New York mental hospitals has actually
decreased.233 The authors reasoned that, after Rivers and its "cumbersome
mechanism," patients were no longer encouraged to write formal refusals,
resulting in the hearing of fewer objections.
234 The conclusion reached was
that because of the delay of medication, the patients' welfare was eroded,
thus providing no clinical or legal benefits to 
the patients. 235
There has been little after-the-fact commentary describing the beneficial
effects of according full judicial procedures to refusing patients. This may
be attributed to the fact that the direct beneficiaries of the greater procedural
protections-mental patients-are a less vocal group than the medical pro-
fession. Nonetheless, some benefits have been recorded in a study includ-
ing patients who, under court order, were administered medication, and then
released.236 The primary benefit of the court order is that, unlike less formal
administrative proceedings, it ensures that the patient will continue using
the medication even after release.237 Rivers v. Katz has also been viewed
favorably as a milestone, establishing that it is the unique function of a ju-
rist to balance a patient's constitutional protections against the interests of
the State.238
The lack of consensus on the benefits of full judicial procedures versus
less formal administrative procedures for refusal cases should provide some
insight into the appropriateness of Congress' decision to defer similar deci-
sions for residents in long-term care facilities to the states. To the extent
OBRA '87 allows these policy determinations to be made at the state level,
the rights of nursing home residents are often afforded greater protection
than they would otherwise receive under the Fourteenth Amendment. Fur-
thermore, in light of the rapidly increasing number of residents in these fa-
Court). See also Steven K. Hoges et al., The Right to Refuse Treatment Under Rogers 
v.
Commissioner: Preliminary Empirical Findings and Comparisons, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 163, 168 (1987) (describing another analysis of Roger v. Commissioner,
which concedes that the new treatment practices serve the purposes of due process well).
However, the article also asks if the patients' true interests are as well served because clini-
cal time and money are diverted from clinical care, subverting the ultimate goal: quality of
care. Id.
232. See J. Richard Ciccone et al., Right to Refuse Treatment: Impact of Rivers v. Katz,
18 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 203, 208 (1990).
233. Id. at 208.
234. Id. at 213-14.
235. Id. at 214.
236. See Schmidt & Geller, supra note 231, at 285-86.
237. Id. at 286.
238. Steven Mintz, Note, The Nightmare of Forcible Medication: The New York Court
of Appeals Protects the Rights of the Mentally Ill Under the State Constitution: Rivers v.
Katz, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 885, 916 (1987).
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cilities, parallel jurisdiction with state courts would share the burden of any
litigation arising under state law. If Congress were to enact specific stan-
dards, all resulting litigation would have to take place in federal court, caus-
ing even greater delay and expense to litigants in the already overburdened
federal courts. Most importantly, though, there is already a significant state
infrastructure for the administration and funding of long-term care facilities.
The states should, therefore, also make the decision as to additional sub-
stantive and procedural rights appropriate for refusal cases in these institu-
tions.
B. The Long-Term Care Ombudsman
Reactions to the long-term care ombudsman solution have been varied.
Some, citing the medical community's powerful impulse to maintain a
sphere of professional influence, have advocated the medical self-
determination of both competent and incompetent patients.2 39 They have
approved and disapproved of the ombudsman procedures in Conroy.24 °
Others have implicitly approved of the notion of an ombudsman, advocat-
ing court-appointed guardianship in the context of non-judicial protective
proceedings.24 1 Still, others have characterized long-term care ombudsman
programs as an overly burdensome, intrusive exercise of state power in an
essentially private domain. 242 This view, however, does not appear to rep-
resent the prevailing one. Indeed, although expressing reservations, most
approve of the ombudsman notion as a compromise solution, which avoids
the expense of judicial proceedings while deferring to the rights of the pa-
243tient.
A comparison of OBRA '87 and the long-term care ombudsman program
discussed in Conroy reveals a congressional desire to extend some protec-
tion to the rights of residents in long term care facilities. However, two im-
portant points may be inferred from these proposed solutions to the prob-
lem. Congress is unwilling to become involved in the administration of any
239. Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARv. L. REV.
1519, 1655 n.97, 1676 (1990).
240. Id.
241. See Mark Fowler, Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 985, 1031 (1984).
242. See Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REV. 375, 435
(1988); Andrew Agrawal, Note, In Re Conroy: Forging a Path to Death with Dignity, 67
B.U.L. REV. 365, 367, 386 (1987).
243. See Gregory Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 Wis. L. REV.
737, 760, 799 (1987); Phoebe A. Haddon, Baby Doe Cases: Compromise and Moral Di-
lemma, 34 EMORY L.J. 545, 564 (1985); Suzanne Levant, Case Comment, Natural Death: An
Alternative in New Jersey, 73 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1352-53 (1985).
[Vol. 13
"Just Say No!"
comprehensive regulatory mechanism to implement this goal. Furthermore,
it has limited the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear refusal cases by
deferring to the states the articulation of any right that exceeds due process.
Congress has also deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction by making no
explicit or implicit mention of a private cause of action under the amend-
ments to the 1965 Act. In addition, the purpose of the ombudsman provi-
sions seems to be to avoid either the situation where judges make medical
244
decisions or where doctors make judicial decisions. This is a very fine
line to tread, but to the extent this policy consideration is respected, it can
only be hoped that a balanced solution will be achieved ultimately which
promotes the rights of the patient while at the same time recognizing the
necessity for a cost-effective administrative framework.1
45
244. Roth, supra note 229, at 150.
245. See Gelfand, supra note 243, at 799.
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